Three Volumes: In Which Are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points That Relate Either to Publick Government, or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done into English by Several Hands.
Punishment – наказание
английский язык онлайн. The latest breaking news, comment and features from The Independent. Capital punishment is the taking of a human life by a government in response to a crime committed by that convict. See arguments for and against. The latest UK and world news, business, sport and comment from The Times and The Sunday Time. For example, the original Russian title ("Преступление и наказание") is not the direct equivalent to the English "Crime and Punishment". "Преступление" (Prestupléniye) is literally translated as 'a stepping across'.
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| Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском. | Перевод ПОЛУЧИЛ НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский: get the punishment, get detention, receive the punishment, get him, gets punished. |
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На этой странице находится вопрос Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?. Здесь же — ответы на него, и похожие вопросы в категории Английский язык, которые можно найти с помощью простой в использовании поисковой системы. Уровень сложности вопроса соответствует уровню подготовки учащихся 10 - 11 классов. В комментариях, оставленных ниже, ознакомьтесь с вариантами ответов посетителей страницы. С ними можно обсудить тему вопроса в режиме on-line. Если ни один из предложенных ответов не устраивает, сформулируйте новый вопрос в поисковой строке, расположенной вверху, и нажмите кнопку. Последние ответы AlexTrask 29 апр. Food festival is held every year in the month of February. During the event, the participants will have to show their..
Darya578 29 апр. Пояснення :.. Kseniya24011 29 апр.
Я прослежу за сторожем, если он виновен я удостоверюсь, чтобы он получил наказание. Эти девчонки не уважают слабых маленьких ботаников, боящихся получить наказание от своих мамочек. Продолжай в том же духе, и получишь наказание! Чтобы этого вновь не повторилось все четверо получат наказание. Ты хочешь получить наказание прямо сейчас? Do I have to begin the punishment now?
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Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010.
For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions.
The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch. For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e.
In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories. There are also widely documented burdensome consequences of a conviction to the family members or loved ones of those who are convicted, and to their communities. These sorts of informal consequences of criminal convictions appear less likely than the formal legal consequences to constitute legal punishment, insofar as they are not intentionally imposed by the state but see Kolber 2012. Still, the informal collateral consequences of a conviction are arguably relevant to theorising about punishment, and we should examine when, if ever, such burdens are relevant to sentencing determinations on sentencing, see s. Further Issues A number of further important questions are relevant to theorising about punishment, which can only be noted here. First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries? What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence?
Considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to these questions see e. Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice — between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified — that the abolitionist challenge can be met. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect — that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified see Heffernan and Kleinig 2000. If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, while also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices that perpetrate serious injustice see Murphy 1973; Duff 2001, ch. Finally, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual system of punishment unjust ified might be not its own operations as such what punishment is or achieves within that system , but the absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the whole system depends for its legitimacy see Duff 2001, ch.
Recent scholarship on punishment has increasingly acknowledged that the justification of punishment depends on the justification of the criminal law more generally, and indeed the legitimacy of the state itself see s. For example, if the state passes laws criminalising conduct that is not justifiably prohibited, then this calls into question the justification of the punishment it imposes for violations of these laws. Similarly, if the procedures by which criminal justice officials apprehend, charge, and prosecute individuals are unjustified, then the subsequent inflictions of punishment will be unjustified as well see Ristroph 2015 and 2016; on specific aspects of criminal procedure, see, e. Bibliography Primoratz 1999, Honderich 2005, Ellis 2012, and Brooks 2013 are useful introductory books. Duff and Garland 1994; Ashworth, von Hirsch; and Roberts 2009; and Tonry 2011 are useful collections of readings. Adelsberg, L. Guenther, and S. Adler, J. Alexander, L.
Allais, L. Altman, A. Altman, M. Anderson, J. Ardal, P. Ashworth, A. Roberts eds. Duff and S. Zedner, and P.
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Braithwaite, J. Tonry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 241—367. Brettschneider, C. Brooks, T. Brown, J. Brownlee, K. Brudner, A. Burgh, R. Caruso, G.
Chau, P. Chiao, V. Christie, N. British Journal of Criminology, 17: 1—15. Ciocchetti, C. Cogley, Z. Timpe and C. Boyd eds. Cottingham, J.
Dagger, R. Laborde and J. Maynor eds. Daly, K. Davidovic, J. Davis, A. New York: Seven Stories Press. Davis, L. Davis, M.
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Tasioulas eds. Green and B. Leiter eds. Garland eds. Farmer, S. Marshall, and V. Ellis, A. Erskine, T. Isaacs and R.
Vernon eds.
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One reason societies have administered punishments is to diminish the perceived need for retaliatory "street justice", blood feud , and vigilantism. Main article: Restorative justice Especially applied to minor offenses, punishment may take the form of the offender "righting the wrong", or making restitution to the victim. Community service or compensation orders are examples of this sort of penalty. Punishment can serve as a means for society to publicly express denunciation of an action as being criminal. Besides educating people regarding what is not acceptable behavior, it serves the dual function of preventing vigilante justice by acknowledging public anger, while concurrently deterring future criminal activity by stigmatizing the offender. This is sometimes called the "Expressive Theory" of denunciation. The critics argue that some individuals spending time and energy and taking risks in punishing others, and the possible loss of the punished group members, would have been selected against if punishment served no function other than signals that could evolve to work by less risky means. Instead of punishment requiring we choose between them, unified theorists argue that they work together as part of some wider goal such as the protection of rights.
Critics argue that punishment is simply revenge. Professor Deirdre Golash, author of The Case against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law, says: We ought not to impose such harm on anyone unless we have a very good reason for doing so. This remark may seem trivially true, but the history of humankind is littered with examples of the deliberate infliction of harm by well-intentioned persons in the vain pursuit of ends which that harm did not further, or in the successful pursuit of questionable ends.
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Fall 6. Will help 7. To win 8. Missshubina201 29 апр. Помогите пожалуйста? Vladimir1110584 28 апр.
Parking in a handicapped spot without proper tags - Парковка на инвалидном месте без соответствующих тэгов 73.
Failure to yield to pedestrians - Непредоставление пешеходам первенства 74. Reckless driving causing accidents - Беспечное вождение и дисциплинарные зоны в связи с авариями 75. Inadequate exhaust system - Наезд на трубы или несанкционированные модификации выхлопной системы 76. Failure to stop at a railroad crossing - Непредоставление перевода при переезде через железную дорогу 77. Failing to provide proof of insurance or registration - Не предоставление подтверждающих документов о страховке или регистрации 78. Driving with a suspended or revoked license - Вождение с отмененными или приостановленными правами 79. Parking in a no parking zone - Парковка в запрещенной зоне 80.
Failure to maintain safety equipment - Нарушение правил оборудования для безопасности передвижения 81. Violation of construction zone rules - Нарушение правил строительной зоны 82. Tailgating - Нарушение дистанцирования с другими автомобилями 83. Failure to pull over for emergency vehicles - Непредоставление первенства экстренному транспорту 84. Tampering with traffic signals - Неправомерное вмешательство в работу дорожных знаков 85. Violation of noise regulations - Нарушение правил шума 86. Exceeding maximum weight limits - Превышение максимально допустимых массовых грузов 87.
Using a cell phone while driving - Использование мобильного телефона в процессе вождения 88. Speeding in a residential area - Превышение скорости в жилой зоне 89. Failure to yield to right of way - Непредоставление первенства правилам движения 90. Failure to observe road signs - Не соблюдение правил движения и знаков 91. Illegal tinted windows - Нелегальные затонированные окна 92. Dangerous vehicle condition - Опасное состояние автомобиля 93. Physical altercation while driving - Физическое противостояние в процессе вождения 94.
Driving on the sidewalk to avoid traffic - Вождение транспортного средства по тротуару для обхода пробок 95. Ignoring flashing school zone lights - Игнорирование мигающих знаков школьной зоны 96.
Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?
Во время встречи была выяснена личность вандала, после чего его вывели с трибун и передали правоохранительным органам. Ru» ведет текстовую онлайн-трансляцию главных событий дня мирового первенства. Подписывайтесь на «Газету.
Подвергнуться наказанию за что… … Толковый словарь Ушакова наказание — телесное, строгое, легкое, исправительное, уголовное , взыскание, кара, казнь, пеня, расправа, штраф, эпитимия. Ср … Словарь синонимов Наказание — Любая реакция, следующая за определенным событием и уменыпающая вероятность возникновения этого события в будущем. К примеру, если ребенка бранят каждый раз, когда он кормит собаку едой со стола, то в конце концов он прекратит это делать. Александр Пушкин Кто жалеет розги своей, тот ненавидит сына; а кто любит, тот с детства наказывает его. Царь Соломон Притчи, 13, 24 В книге Бытия немало примеров наказания тех, кто ослушался… … Сводная энциклопедия афоризмов НАКАЗАНИЕ — punishment Преднамеренное нанесение ущерба субъекту уполномоченными на то лицами, являющееся результатом нарушения им правил, соблюдение которых от него требуют и за нарушение которых он считается ответственным. Поскольку принудительная власть… … Политология.
Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values.
A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert. Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012. Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment.
Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch. This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment.
Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017. A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc.
Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019. Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch.
For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73. One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch.
The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e. See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc.
Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism. For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find.
An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment.
The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012. For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013.
One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch.
For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H. Morris 1981 and Hampton 1984; for a more recent account, see Demetriou 2012; for criticism, see Deigh 1984, Shafer-Landau 1991. But education theorists also take seriously the Hegelian worry discussed earlier; they view punishment not as a means of conditioning people to behave in certain ways, but rather as a means of teaching them that what they have done should not be done because it is morally wrong. Thus although the education view sets offender reform as an end, it also implies certain nonconsequentialist constraints on how we may appropriately pursue this end. Another distinctive feature of the moral education view is that it conceives of punishment as aiming to confer a benefit on the offender: the benefit of moral education. Critics have objected to the moral education view on various grounds, however. Some are sceptical about whether punishment is the most effective means of moral education.
Others deny that most offenders need moral education; many offenders realise what they are doing is wrong but are weak-willed, impulsive, etc. Each of the theories discussed in this section incorporates, in various ways, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements. Whether any of these is more plausible than pure consequentialist or pure retributivist alternatives is, not surprisingly, a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. One possibility, of course, is that none of the theories on offer is successful because punishment is, ultimately, unjustifiable. The next section considers penal abolitionism. Abolition and Alternatives Abolitionist theorising about punishment takes many different forms, united only by the insistence that we should seek to abolish, rather than merely to reform, our practices of punishment. Classic abolitionist texts include Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994. An initial question is precisely what practices should be abolished. Some abolitionists focus on particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment see, e. Davis 2003.
Insofar as such critiques are grounded in concerns about racial disparities, mass incarceration, police abuses, and other features of the U. At the same time, insofar as the critiques are based on particular features of the U.
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Punishment – наказание
Преступление и наказание в свежем выпуске BigAppleSchool Podcast. Ведущие пытаются выяснить, что толкает людей на совершение преступлений, спорят над темой реабилитации преступников в обществе, а также приводят аргументы за и против смертной казни. Примеры перевода «НАКАЗАНИЕ» в контексте. Во время судебного разбирательства (court proceeding) выносят приговор (to pass verdict on smb) и назначают наказание (to mete out punishment to smb). Власти Великобритании ужесточат наказание за нарушение закона о шпионаже, увеличив срок до пожизненного заключения, сообщает The Daily Telegraph со ссылкой на главу британского МВД Прити Пател. Парламент Греции одобрил введение уголовного наказания за распространение фейковых новостей о коронавирусе, передает РИА «Новости». В поправках к существующей в УК Греции статье уточняется, что уголовное преследование предусмотрено за публикацию ложных. Перевод наказание по-английски. Как перевести на английский наказание?
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Русско-английский словарь. Перевод «Наказание». на английский язык: «punishment». We here at the Daily Stormer are opposed to violence. We seek revolution through the education of the masses. When the information is available to the people, systemic change will be inevitable and unavoidable. Anyone suggesting or promoting violence in the comments section will be immediately. В статье рассмотрен перевод 'наказание' на английский язык с примером использования и полезными ссылками на другую лексику. Latest London news, business, sport, celebrity and entertainment from the London Evening Standard. Many translated example sentences containing "наказание" – English-Russian dictionary and search engine for English translations. В статье рассмотрен перевод 'наказание' на английский язык с примером использования и полезными ссылками на другую лексику.