Источник: РИА "Новости". Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма.
Канте купил клуб в Бельгии после подписания контракта «Аль-Иттихадом»
The affirmation, a priori and without concept, can make a philosopher smile or choke up. But a geographer will see it as a sign of an old grudge. His judgment is imperative and categorical.
Почему история философии делится на «до» и «после» Канта? И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками? Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М.
The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world.
But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties.
We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing.
Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects.
If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world.
But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone.
For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure.
First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause.
From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion.
This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located.
We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition.
Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being.
We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.
The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition.
Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did.
Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers.
Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations.
All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind.
Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal.
At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class.
But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves.
The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility.
If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects.
That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998.
This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves.
A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general.
So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading.
The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience.
To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking.
Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one.
Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version.
On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist.
Кроме того, Кант выделяет такие важные для его философской школы виды способности суждения — эстетическую и телеологическую. Это далеко не полный обзор научного наследия Канта, мы прошлись лишь по самым известным его произведениям, составивших скелет кантианства — философского течения, последователи которого или же его образовавшихся в процессе ответвлений есть и по сей день. А его мысли нашли своё применение в философии науки, причём любой, даже той, которая выделилась как самостоятельное направление уже много позже смерти самого Канта. Конечно, реальные заслуги Канта намного шире. В частности, именно он первым среди классических немецких философов осмыслил необходимость существования университетов, а также как никто метко дал характеристику своей эпохе. Просвещение он характеризовал как выход человека из состояния своего несовершеннолетия, то есть из невозможности пользоваться разумом без помощи кого-то другого.
Это был в высшей степени оригинальный мыслитель, которого ставят в один ряд по значению для с Платоном, Коперником или Ньютоном. Немалая его заслуга и в развитии педагогики, в своих работах он вывел собственные идеалы, цели и задачи этой науки, не потерявшие своей актуальности и по сей день. Научные заслуги Канта признавали и его почитатели, и его противники. Наверное, потому и задержалось его продвижение по карьерной лестнице, что было у него много завистников. Лишь в 1770 году он наконец стал профессором. Сам Кант никогда не церемонился со своими критиками, как среди коллег-учёных, обзывая их неспособными понять его лентяями, а их претензии — существующими только в их головах; так и среди власть предержащих и духовенства, которым не нравился излишний материализм учёного.
Было немало людей, считавших его сумасбродом. Но всем приходилось мириться с масштабом личности учёного, который уже при жизни стал иконой для молодых философов во многих странах. На рубеже XIX века здоровье уже немолодого учёного пошатнулось. К тому времени он уже дважды избирался ректором Кёнигсбергского университета — в 1786 году и в 1788 году. Учёный реагировал на всё более прогрессирующие болезни в своём духе, жалуясь, что не знает, зачем и как ему жить, если он больше ничего не может принести в этот мир. Но, даже находясь при смерти, из-за деменции мало что соображая, он преображался на глазах, когда с ним пытались заговорить на научные темы, пытаясь вести диспуты с приходившими его навестить коллегами и учениками.
Философ тихо отошёл в мир иной 12 февраля 1804 года. На похороны учёного пришли тысячи людей, одних только студентов были сотни — столь велик был авторитет Канта. Похоронили его у северной стены Кафедрального собора Кёнигсберга. Несмотря на все перипетии истории, в том числе разрушительные бои за Кёнигсберг 1945 года, могила сохранилась до наших дней, и является одним из мест паломничества в современном Калининграде. Кант в советской и российской науке Хотя сочинения Канта проникли в Россию ещё при жизни автора, достаточно долгое время массово они не издавались на русском языке. А в первые десятилетия Советской власти к нему стало иметь место довольно настороженное отношение, как и вообще ко всем классикам немецкой философии.
Особенно это ярко проявилось в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Кроме того, в публикациях тех лет припоминались некоторые его высказывания, которые можно при определённом подходе расценить как предтечу германского милитаризма и нацизма. Но всё это было налётом времени — даже тогда не отрицалось, что из кантианства черпали и Гегель, и Маркс, и Энгельс, и другие классики философии. В 1960-е годы на русском языке впервые было издано собрание сочинений великого философа в шести томах. В предисловии издатели отмечали, что труды Канта- одни из теоретических источников марксизма, без изучения которых невозможно понять диалектику, а также полноценно критиковать «современную буржуазную философию». Выпущенные в дальнейшем не вошедшие в собрание малоизвестные работы, а также записи лекций, письма и прочие материалы в целом довершили дело издания на русском языке всего наследия философа.
Приблизительно в те же годы в значительной степени был возбуждён интерес исследователей к научному наследию Канта.
Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер»
In 1754 and 1755 he published three scientific works — one of which, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens 1755 , was a major book in which, among other things, he developed what later became known as the nebular hypothesis about the formation of the solar system. Unfortunately, the printer went bankrupt and the book had little immediate impact. To secure qualifications for teaching at the university, Kant also wrote two Latin dissertations: the first, entitled Concise Outline of Some Reflections on Fire 1755 , earned him the Magister degree; and the second, New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition 1755 , entitled him to teach as an unsalaried lecturer. The following year he published another Latin work, The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology 1756 , in hopes of succeeding Knutzen as associate professor of logic and metaphysics, though Kant failed to secure this position. Both works depart from Leibniz-Wolffian views, though not radically. Kant held this position from 1755 to 1770, during which period he would lecture an average of twenty hours per week on logic, metaphysics, and ethics, as well as mathematics, physics, and physical geography. In his lectures Kant used textbooks by Wolffian authors such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 1714—1762 and Georg Friedrich Meier 1718—1777 , but he followed them loosely and used them to structure his own reflections, which drew on a wide range of ideas of contemporary interest. These ideas often stemmed from British sentimentalist philosophers such as David Hume 1711—1776 and Francis Hutcheson 1694—1747 , some of whose texts were translated into German in the mid-1750s; and from the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712—1778 , who published a flurry of works in the early 1760s. From early in his career Kant was a popular and successful lecturer. After several years of relative quiet, Kant unleashed another burst of publications in 1762—1764, including five philosophical works. The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures 1762 rehearses criticisms of Aristotelian logic that were developed by other German philosophers.
The book attracted several positive and some negative reviews. In Negative Magnitudes Kant also argues that the morality of an action is a function of the internal forces that motivate one to act, rather than of the external physical actions or their consequences. Finally, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime 1764 deals mainly with alleged differences in the tastes of men and women and of people from different cultures. After it was published, Kant filled his own interleaved copy of this book with often unrelated handwritten remarks, many of which reflect the deep influence of Rousseau on his thinking about moral philosophy in the mid-1760s. These works helped to secure Kant a broader reputation in Germany, but for the most part they were not strikingly original. While some of his early works tend to emphasize rationalist ideas, others have a more empiricist emphasis. During this time Kant was striving to work out an independent position, but before the 1770s his views remained fluid. In 1766 Kant published his first work concerned with the possibility of metaphysics, which later became a central topic of his mature philosophy. In 1770, at the age of forty-six, Kant was appointed to the chair in logic and metaphysics at the Albertina, after teaching for fifteen years as an unsalaried lecturer and working since 1766 as a sublibrarian to supplement his income. Kant was turned down for the same position in 1758.
In order to inaugurate his new position, Kant also wrote one more Latin dissertation: Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World 1770 , which is known as the Inaugural Dissertation. Inspired by Crusius and the Swiss natural philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert 1728—1777 , Kant distinguishes between two fundamental powers of cognition, sensibility and understanding intelligence , where the Leibniz-Wolffians regarded understanding intellect as the only fundamental power. Moreover, as the title of the Inaugural Dissertation indicates, Kant argues that sensibility and understanding are directed at two different worlds: sensibility gives us access to the sensible world, while understanding enables us to grasp a distinct intelligible world. The Inaugural Dissertation thus develops a form of Platonism; and it rejects the view of British sentimentalists that moral judgments are based on feelings of pleasure or pain, since Kant now holds that moral judgments are based on pure understanding alone. After 1770 Kant never surrendered the views that sensibility and understanding are distinct powers of cognition, that space and time are subjective forms of human sensibility, and that moral judgments are based on pure understanding or reason alone. But his embrace of Platonism in the Inaugural Dissertation was short-lived. He soon denied that our understanding is capable of insight into an intelligible world, which cleared the path toward his mature position in the Critique of Pure Reason 1781 , according to which the understanding like sensibility supplies forms that structure our experience of the sensible world, to which human knowledge is limited, while the intelligible or noumenal world is strictly unknowable to us. Kant spent a decade working on the Critique of Pure Reason and published nothing else of significance between 1770 and 1781. Kant also published a number of important essays in this period, including Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim 1784 and Conjectural Beginning of Human History 1786 , his main contributions to the philosophy of history; An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Jacobi 1743—1819 accused the recently deceased G.
Lessing 1729—1781 of Spinozism. With these works Kant secured international fame and came to dominate German philosophy in the late 1780s. But in 1790 he announced that the Critique of the Power of Judgment brought his critical enterprise to an end 5:170. By then K. In 1794 his chair at Jena passed to J. Kant retired from teaching in 1796. For nearly two decades he had lived a highly disciplined life focused primarily on completing his philosophical system, which began to take definite shape in his mind only in middle age. After retiring he came to believe that there was a gap in this system separating the metaphysical foundations of natural science from physics itself, and he set out to close this gap in a series of notes that postulate the existence of an ether or caloric matter. Kant died February 12, 1804, just short of his eightieth birthday. See also Bxiv; and 4:255—257.
Thus metaphysics for Kant concerns a priori knowledge, or knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience; and he associates a priori knowledge with reason. The project of the Critique is to examine whether, how, and to what extent human reason is capable of a priori knowledge. The Enlightenment was a reaction to the rise and successes of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The spectacular achievements of Newton in particular engendered widespread confidence and optimism about the power of human reason to control nature and to improve human life. One effect of this new confidence in reason was that traditional authorities were increasingly questioned. Why should we need political or religious authorities to tell us how to live or what to believe, if each of us has the capacity to figure these things out for ourselves? Kant expresses this Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason in the Critique: Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. Axi Enlightenment is about thinking for oneself rather than letting others think for you, according to What is Enlightenment?
In this essay, Kant also expresses the Enlightenment faith in the inevitability of progress. A few independent thinkers will gradually inspire a broader cultural movement, which ultimately will lead to greater freedom of action and governmental reform. The problem is that to some it seemed unclear whether progress would in fact ensue if reason enjoyed full sovereignty over traditional authorities; or whether unaided reasoning would instead lead straight to materialism, fatalism, atheism, skepticism Bxxxiv , or even libertinism and authoritarianism 8:146. The Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason was tied to the expectation that it would not lead to any of these consequences but instead would support certain key beliefs that tradition had always sanctioned. Crucially, these included belief in God, the soul, freedom, and the compatibility of science with morality and religion. Although a few intellectuals rejected some or all of these beliefs, the general spirit of the Enlightenment was not so radical. The Enlightenment was about replacing traditional authorities with the authority of individual human reason, but it was not about overturning traditional moral and religious beliefs. Yet the original inspiration for the Enlightenment was the new physics, which was mechanistic. If nature is entirely governed by mechanistic, causal laws, then it may seem that there is no room for freedom, a soul, or anything but matter in motion. This threatened the traditional view that morality requires freedom.
We must be free in order to choose what is right over what is wrong, because otherwise we cannot be held responsible. It also threatened the traditional religious belief in a soul that can survive death or be resurrected in an afterlife. So modern science, the pride of the Enlightenment, the source of its optimism about the powers of human reason, threatened to undermine traditional moral and religious beliefs that free rational thought was expected to support. This was the main intellectual crisis of the Enlightenment. In other words, free rational inquiry adequately supports all of these essential human interests and shows them to be mutually consistent. So reason deserves the sovereignty attributed to it by the Enlightenment. The Inaugural Dissertation also tries to reconcile Newtonian science with traditional morality and religion in a way, but its strategy is different from that of the Critique. According to the Inaugural Dissertation, Newtonian science is true of the sensible world, to which sensibility gives us access; and the understanding grasps principles of divine and moral perfection in a distinct intelligible world, which are paradigms for measuring everything in the sensible world. So on this view our knowledge of the intelligible world is a priori because it does not depend on sensibility, and this a priori knowledge furnishes principles for judging the sensible world because in some way the sensible world itself conforms to or imitates the intelligible world. Soon after writing the Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant expressed doubts about this view.
As he explained in a February 21, 1772 letter to his friend and former student, Marcus Herz: In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible…. And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world.
But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself.
Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone.
Начал писать свою первую работу в 20 лет Один из главных трудов Канта — «Критика чистого разума» — вышел в 1781 году, когда автору было уже 57 лет.
А вот свою первую работу мыслитель начал еще в 1744-м. Она называлась «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил», и в ней Кант вступил в полемику с Декартом и Лейбницем. Научное сообщество встретило этот труд прохладно и раскритиковало автора за излишнюю многословность и поверхностные познания в области механики. И все-таки Иммануил Кант добился своей цели — на него обратили внимание. Правда, впоследствии он испытывал неловкость, когда вспоминал о своей пробе пера. Был ипохондриком и строго следовал расписанию Еще в детстве будущий философ читал труды по медицине и находил симптомы описанных болезней у себя.
Его ипохондрия с возрастом только усилилась и привела к появлению еще одной его особенности. Будучи уверенным, что на врачей и лекарства того времени полагаться нельзя, Иммануил Кант придумал строгий распорядок дня, который должен был укрепить его тело и разум. Первые часы после пробуждения он посвящал собственным работам, далее отправлялся в университет читать лекции. Затем следовал единственный прием пищи за сутки — плотный обед в час дня. Обедал Кант всегда в компании друзей, среди которых были представители кенигсбергской знати и купечества. Чтобы беседа за столом была оживленной и интересной, философ даже придумал собственное правило: число гостей должно быть больше количества граций, но не превышать количество муз.
А еще на обедах его доме говорили о чем угодно, но не о философии.
Выходит, организаторы присвоения имени аэропорту Храброво столкнулись с трудностями написания имени немецкого философа. Несмотря на трудности в орфографии в самолётах, Кант по-прежнему лидирует, опережая даже самого резвого ближайшего конкурента - императрицу Елизавету Петровну. По состоянию на 21. Праздник народного волеизъявления продолжится до 30 ноября 2018 года.
Это произведение автор писал три года, и оно увидело свет в 1749 году. После смерти отца молодой человек бросил учебу в университете. Чтобы прокормить семью, Иммануил стал домашним учителем. В свободное от уроков время он занимался теоретическим исследованием Солнечной системы и вскоре опубликовал свою гипотезу о ее происхождении из первоначальной туманности. В 1755 году Кант защитил докторскую диссертацию, давшую ему право преподавать в университете.
После этого он в течение сорока лет вел лекции в альма-матер. В 1770 году он был назначен профессором логики и метафизики Кенигсбергского университета.
Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant
Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Показать больше.
Macron said Europe also risks falling behind economically in a context where global free-trade rules are being challenged by major competitors, and he said it should aim to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, biotechnologies and renewable energy. Europe needs less fragmented markets for energy, telecoms and financial services, and must also cut red tape, he added. The French leader hopes his speech will have the same impact as a similar address at the Sorbonne he made seven years ago that prefigured some significant EU policy shifts.
Канта Валентин Балановский. Кое-что может найти и человек, который хорошо разбирается в предмете. Книга вышла тиражом в пять тысяч экземпляров и доступна в магазине Кафедрального собора. Получить издание с автографом смогли все, кто пришел на встречу с автором 21 и 23 апреля. Но эта лекция - также доказательство безбрежности мира Канта.
Кант - такая величина, что рядом с ним можно поставить любое другое слово, любую тему и написать на эту тему трактат. Кант отражается в каждой капле мироздания, и, надеюсь, к концу разговора будет ясно, что музыка - не крошечная часть его вселенной.
Эммануэль Макрон, по-видимому, хотел бы скопировать модель и перенести ее на Европу. При этом он понимает, что вассальный статус Европы в отношениях с США, — серьезное препятствие к реализации этой задумки. Правда, как я уже писал, вассальный статус не мешает Макрону, когда, по его мнению, не время возмущаться, и движут им в эти моменты исключительно французские, а не европейские интересы. Кроме того, слова о том, что Европа "особенная", конечно, справедливы, но не в том смысле или не только в том, о котором говорит французский президент. Ведь Европа — колыбель колониализма, тяжелой и жестокой эксплуатации остального мира.
Вспомним, что именно Франция была одним из лидеров этого порядка при всех ее прогрессивных достижениях, которые у нее не отнять, но которые ее и не оправдывают. Сейчас постепенно освобождаются некоторые страны Западной Африки, которые еще долго после формального обретения самостоятельности оставались под косвенным французским экономическим и политическим контролем. Восстания в таких странах, как Буркина-Фасо, Нигер, Мали, и даже демократический переворот в Сенегале показывают ослабление французского влияния, а значит, и ограничение возможностей Парижа эксплуатировать эти бедные, но богатые ресурсами, африканские страны. Понятно, что французскую элиту устраивает нарратив о том, что все это происходит из-за "российского влияния", хотя это мнение далеко от истины. Более того, тут снова кроется глубокое унижение местных народов и их воли к суверенитету. Европе действительно нужно меняться. Некоторые важные изменения упомянуты в речи Макрона, но только фрагментарно, не полностью и в ряду новых проблем, которые не нужны Европе.
Эммануэль Макрон популистски заявляет, что Европа должна быть готова "воевать сама". На самом деле это даже не популизм, так как европейский народ не хочет войны. Это элиты, которые им управляют, вероятно, жаждут ее. Эммануэль Макрон в своей речи не оставляет ни шанса идее о том, что Европе нужен стабильный мир,что ей нужно заканчивать текущие войны и предотвращать новые. Его "рецепт" для вооруженного конфликта на Украине — еще большая эскалация. Для него неприемлема мысль о том, что Россию и Украину, надавив на них одинаково, следует склонить к прекращению конфликта и признанию положения, в котором ни одна из них не достигнет своих целей, но которое принесет мир.
Emmanuel Kant, no place to chance!
Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Эммануэль, но не Кант! Шольц для Путина является более весомой фигурой, который представляет интересы бизнеса Германии. Путин видит давление, которому подвергается. With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity.
Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant
Breaking Irish and International News. Подробная информация о фильме Последние дни Иммануила Канта на сайте Кинопоиск. Когда принималось решение широко отметить 300-летие немецкого философа Иммануила Канта, необходимость интеграции отечественной гуманитарной науки с мировой еще не. Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Posts about Emmanuel Kant written by Jack Marshall. The Life, Work and Legacy of Carl Jung. Category: Emmanuel Kant.
Advance: концепция Макрона о воинственной и сильной Европе ошибочна
Kant was turned down for the same position in 1758. In order to inaugurate his new position, Kant also wrote one more Latin dissertation: Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World 1770 , which is known as the Inaugural Dissertation. Inspired by Crusius and the Swiss natural philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert 1728—1777 , Kant distinguishes between two fundamental powers of cognition, sensibility and understanding intelligence , where the Leibniz-Wolffians regarded understanding intellect as the only fundamental power. Moreover, as the title of the Inaugural Dissertation indicates, Kant argues that sensibility and understanding are directed at two different worlds: sensibility gives us access to the sensible world, while understanding enables us to grasp a distinct intelligible world. The Inaugural Dissertation thus develops a form of Platonism; and it rejects the view of British sentimentalists that moral judgments are based on feelings of pleasure or pain, since Kant now holds that moral judgments are based on pure understanding alone. After 1770 Kant never surrendered the views that sensibility and understanding are distinct powers of cognition, that space and time are subjective forms of human sensibility, and that moral judgments are based on pure understanding or reason alone. But his embrace of Platonism in the Inaugural Dissertation was short-lived.
He soon denied that our understanding is capable of insight into an intelligible world, which cleared the path toward his mature position in the Critique of Pure Reason 1781 , according to which the understanding like sensibility supplies forms that structure our experience of the sensible world, to which human knowledge is limited, while the intelligible or noumenal world is strictly unknowable to us. Kant spent a decade working on the Critique of Pure Reason and published nothing else of significance between 1770 and 1781. Kant also published a number of important essays in this period, including Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim 1784 and Conjectural Beginning of Human History 1786 , his main contributions to the philosophy of history; An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Jacobi 1743—1819 accused the recently deceased G. Lessing 1729—1781 of Spinozism. With these works Kant secured international fame and came to dominate German philosophy in the late 1780s.
But in 1790 he announced that the Critique of the Power of Judgment brought his critical enterprise to an end 5:170. By then K. In 1794 his chair at Jena passed to J. Kant retired from teaching in 1796. For nearly two decades he had lived a highly disciplined life focused primarily on completing his philosophical system, which began to take definite shape in his mind only in middle age. After retiring he came to believe that there was a gap in this system separating the metaphysical foundations of natural science from physics itself, and he set out to close this gap in a series of notes that postulate the existence of an ether or caloric matter.
Kant died February 12, 1804, just short of his eightieth birthday. See also Bxiv; and 4:255—257. Thus metaphysics for Kant concerns a priori knowledge, or knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience; and he associates a priori knowledge with reason. The project of the Critique is to examine whether, how, and to what extent human reason is capable of a priori knowledge. The Enlightenment was a reaction to the rise and successes of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The spectacular achievements of Newton in particular engendered widespread confidence and optimism about the power of human reason to control nature and to improve human life.
One effect of this new confidence in reason was that traditional authorities were increasingly questioned. Why should we need political or religious authorities to tell us how to live or what to believe, if each of us has the capacity to figure these things out for ourselves? Kant expresses this Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason in the Critique: Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. Axi Enlightenment is about thinking for oneself rather than letting others think for you, according to What is Enlightenment?
In this essay, Kant also expresses the Enlightenment faith in the inevitability of progress. A few independent thinkers will gradually inspire a broader cultural movement, which ultimately will lead to greater freedom of action and governmental reform. The problem is that to some it seemed unclear whether progress would in fact ensue if reason enjoyed full sovereignty over traditional authorities; or whether unaided reasoning would instead lead straight to materialism, fatalism, atheism, skepticism Bxxxiv , or even libertinism and authoritarianism 8:146. The Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason was tied to the expectation that it would not lead to any of these consequences but instead would support certain key beliefs that tradition had always sanctioned. Crucially, these included belief in God, the soul, freedom, and the compatibility of science with morality and religion. Although a few intellectuals rejected some or all of these beliefs, the general spirit of the Enlightenment was not so radical.
The Enlightenment was about replacing traditional authorities with the authority of individual human reason, but it was not about overturning traditional moral and religious beliefs. Yet the original inspiration for the Enlightenment was the new physics, which was mechanistic. If nature is entirely governed by mechanistic, causal laws, then it may seem that there is no room for freedom, a soul, or anything but matter in motion. This threatened the traditional view that morality requires freedom. We must be free in order to choose what is right over what is wrong, because otherwise we cannot be held responsible. It also threatened the traditional religious belief in a soul that can survive death or be resurrected in an afterlife.
So modern science, the pride of the Enlightenment, the source of its optimism about the powers of human reason, threatened to undermine traditional moral and religious beliefs that free rational thought was expected to support. This was the main intellectual crisis of the Enlightenment. In other words, free rational inquiry adequately supports all of these essential human interests and shows them to be mutually consistent. So reason deserves the sovereignty attributed to it by the Enlightenment. The Inaugural Dissertation also tries to reconcile Newtonian science with traditional morality and religion in a way, but its strategy is different from that of the Critique. According to the Inaugural Dissertation, Newtonian science is true of the sensible world, to which sensibility gives us access; and the understanding grasps principles of divine and moral perfection in a distinct intelligible world, which are paradigms for measuring everything in the sensible world.
So on this view our knowledge of the intelligible world is a priori because it does not depend on sensibility, and this a priori knowledge furnishes principles for judging the sensible world because in some way the sensible world itself conforms to or imitates the intelligible world. Soon after writing the Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant expressed doubts about this view. As he explained in a February 21, 1772 letter to his friend and former student, Marcus Herz: In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible…. And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world.
But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world.
But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing.
Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world.
But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone. For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure.
First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause. From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion.
This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition.
Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter.
Последний раздел трансцендентальной логики — трансцендентальная диалектика, толкуемая как логика иллюзий, в которые впадает разум, поскольку он постоянно стремится выйти за пределы опыта. Это стремление — источник всех метафизических систем, их претензий на сверхопытное знание. Несостоятельность этих стремлений, однако, не означает, что основные идеи метафизики мир как целое; свобода, предшествующая необходимости; субстанциальность души; Бог должны быть отброшены. Эти идеи имманентны разуму, они являются регулятивными принципами познания, осуществляют высший синтез знаний, приобретаемых рассудком. Метафизика — высшая культура разума, без которой немыслимо его существование.
Необходимо, однако, создание метафизики как науки, как системы априорных синтетических суждений, которые не претендуют на познание трансцендентного. Это значит, что идеи метафизики никоим образом не указывают на существование того, что в них мыслится, т. Отсюда его убеждение: «Мне пришлось ограничить [aufheben] знание, чтобы освободить место вере... Речь идёт не об ограничении познания природы или общества, а об ограничении претензий разума на познание метафизической реальности, которая принципиально недоступна познанию. Одним из важнейших разделов трансцендентальной диалектики является учение об антиномиях , т. Каждая антиномия состоит из тезиса и антитезиса, причём оба эти положения в равной мере доказуемы. Так, тезис одной из антиномий утверждает, что существует «свободная причинность», т. Антитезис, напротив, утверждает, что нет никакой свободы, и всё совершается по законам природы. Антиномии кажутся неразрешимыми противоречиями, однако Кант полагает, что они вполне разрешимы, если учесть, что, кроме чувственно воспринимаемой реальности, существует трансцендентный мир «вещей в себе» и человек представляет собой не только явление природы, но и «вещь в себе». В таком случае антиномия свободы и необходимости вполне разрешима: человек как «вещь в себе» свободен, но он же подчинён необходимости как явление, природное существо.
Все главные проблемы критической философии Канта сводятся к вопросу: «Что такое человек? В центре «Критики практического разума» — понятие чистого нравственного сознания, не признающего никаких иных побудительных мотивов поступков человека, кроме свободного от всяких предпочтений сознания долга. Это означает, что нравственное сознание, в силу своей автономии, свободы, независимо также от религии. Такое воздаяние, как правило, неосуществимо в земной человеческой жизни. Но поскольку справедливость не знает границ во времени и пространстве, необходимо верить в загробную жизнь людей. Это доказательство, обосновывая разумность и необходимость религиозной веры, не утверждает, однако, что Бог и бессмертие души действительно существуют, ибо трансцендентное абсолютно непознаваемо. Всеобъемлющим нравственным законом является, по Канту, категорический императив безусловное повеление , который гласит: поступай так, чтобы максима т. Теория практического разума включает в себя и учение о праве, правовом государстве. Право является реализацией свободы члена общества, ограниченной лишь свободой других его членов. Республика, принцип которой составляет разделение властей, — постулат чистого практического разума.
Поэтому человек лишь постольку морален, поскольку он признаёт равенство всех других индивидов перед законом, отрицая тем самым любые сословные привилегии.
Русские офицеры, образованные люди, с удовольствием ходили на лекции Канта, и даже брали у него частные уроки. А в 1762 году философа избрали членом Петербургской Академии наук. Философ и мыслитель В тот период Кант был столь загружен, что ему некогда было заниматься собственно наукой. До 1762 года, когда Кёнигсберг вновь попал под власть Берлина, вышло лишь одно его небольшое эссе.
Зато как раз в том году он публикует свой известный труд «Ложное мудрствование в четырёх фигурах силлогизма», а в 1763 году продолжил развитие высказанных идей в своей следующей работе «Опыт введения в философию понятия отрицательных величин». Это одно из самых известных его произведений, своеобразное исследование противоположностей и суждений. Тогда же обозначились его стремления создать и сформулировать свою собственную теорию познания. Но путь к своей теории занял у Канта десятки лет. Сам он формулировал её как смычку трёх элементов — метафизики, морали и религии.
Соответственно, Кант рассматривал их как совокупность вопросов, соответственно каждому элементу это: «Что я могу знать? Высшей же точкой своей модели он видел антропологию, которая должна была отвечать на вопрос «Что такое человек? Пик творчества Канта — это его зрелость, 1780-е годы. Именно тогда вышли самые знаменитые его работы, которые и по сей день являются одними из фундаментальных работ мировой философской мысли. В 1781 году выходит «Критика чистого разума» Кант попытался осмыслить возможности познания, в первую очередь эмпирическим путём.
Как известно, данный путь познания, предполагающий практические опыты и исследования, является основополагающим в науке и по сей день, а заложенные Кантом мысли, творчески развитые и обогащённые последующими поколениями философов, имеют хождение не только в гуманитарных, но и в точных науках, и по сей день. Такие понятия, как «вещь себе», субъективность пространства и времени, подчинение бытия человеческой мысли и по сей день являются важнейшими постулатами в философии. В продолжение своего трактата в 1788 году Кант выпускает «Критику практического разума». Каждому, кто изучал в университете философию, известно о разделении учёным разума на теоретический и практический, о необходимости сдерживать теорию при доброкачественной культивации практики. Ещё более Кант в этой своей работе определил разум как основоположник познания в целом.
Наконец, третья основополагающая философская работе Канта вышла в 1790 году, и получила название «Критика способности суждения». Здесь он окончательно подводит итоги своим мыслям, высказанным в двух вышерассмотренных трудах. Кант делит философию на практическую и теоретическую, в основе которых лежит не метод, а предмет познания; а также выделяет царство свободы и царство природы, каждое из которых обладает своими собственными законами, только первое — физическими, основанными на принципах естествознания, то второй — человеческой моралью и нравственностью. В этой же своей работе он выделяет фундаментальные способности человеческой души — к познанию, к желанию и к удовольствию; а также подводит базу под принцип целесообразности природного многообразия, подчинения его некоей закономерности. Кроме того, Кант выделяет такие важные для его философской школы виды способности суждения — эстетическую и телеологическую.
Это далеко не полный обзор научного наследия Канта, мы прошлись лишь по самым известным его произведениям, составивших скелет кантианства — философского течения, последователи которого или же его образовавшихся в процессе ответвлений есть и по сей день. А его мысли нашли своё применение в философии науки, причём любой, даже той, которая выделилась как самостоятельное направление уже много позже смерти самого Канта. Конечно, реальные заслуги Канта намного шире. В частности, именно он первым среди классических немецких философов осмыслил необходимость существования университетов, а также как никто метко дал характеристику своей эпохе. Просвещение он характеризовал как выход человека из состояния своего несовершеннолетия, то есть из невозможности пользоваться разумом без помощи кого-то другого.
Это был в высшей степени оригинальный мыслитель, которого ставят в один ряд по значению для с Платоном, Коперником или Ньютоном. Немалая его заслуга и в развитии педагогики, в своих работах он вывел собственные идеалы, цели и задачи этой науки, не потерявшие своей актуальности и по сей день.
Поэтому передо мной встала задача — изучить политическую мысль философа. Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение.
I Kant Even: German Chancellor Triggered After Putin Quotes Legendary Philosopher
Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма. See an archive of all immanuel kant stories published on the New York Media network, which includes NYMag, The Cut, Vulture, and Grub Street.
Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant
With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. Posts about Emmanuel Kant written by Jack Marshall. Последние дни Иммануила Канта: Directed by Philippe Collin. Bowman on Kant anti-Semitism. Иммануил Кант-немецкий философ, родоначальник немецкой классической философии, стоящий на грани эпох Просвещения и Романтизма. Emmanuel Kant. Biden Admin Reverses Trump Policy, Readies More Tax Funds For Research Using Aborted Babies. P. Gardner Goldsmith | April 18, 2021.